

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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TOP SECRET/XGDS (5) (B) (3)

Attachment

25 NOV 1977

November 22, 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR


The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Director, Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Enhanced Radiation Warheads

Attached is the summary of conclusions for the Special Coordination Committee Meeting November 16 on Enhanced Radiation Warheads.

This document is to be held very closely and distributed only to those officers in your agency with a strict need to know.

Attachment

  
Christine Dodson  
Staff Secretary

DOE review completed.

NSC review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET/XGDS (5) (B) (3)

Attachment

TOP SECRET/XGDS

SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING

November 16, 1977

Time and Place: 3:45 p.m. - 5:15 p.m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Enhanced Radiation Warheads

Participants:

State

Cyrus Vance (first half hour)  
George Vest  
David Gompert

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

Defense

Harold Brown  
Charles Duncan  
David McGiffert

NSC

Reginald Bartholomew  
Robert Hunter  
James Thomson (Notetaker)

CIA

Stansfield Turner

JCS

George Brown  
William Smith

ACDA

Paul Warnke  
John Newhouse

Energy

James Schlesinger  
Alfred Starbird  
J. Bratton (first half hour)

MBFR Delegation

Stanley Resor

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

All agreed that the US should produce enhanced radiation (ER) warheads. Secretary Vance and Ambassador Resor favored an offer in MBFR not to deploy ER if the Soviets agreed to withdraw a substantial number of tanks in addition to those contained in the West's proposal. Secretary Brown, General Brown, Secretary Schlesinger, and Dr. Brzezinski did not favor tying ER to MBFR. Secretary Brown suggested that we tell the Soviets that we will not deploy ER if they do not deploy the SS-X-20. If, as we expect, they reject that idea, we would proceed with production and deployment\*; we would, however, consider linking ER deployment to MBFR at that point.

\* The Energy Department reported that the first ER weapon could be produced about 14 months after a decision to do so.

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Dr. Brzezinski asked if all agreed to recommend to the President the following approach:

1. A US position in favor of ER production.
2. An attempt to get the Allies, especially the FRG, to agree to deployment in Europe as a precondition to US production.
3. At the same time, initiation of wider Allied consultations on the broad security issues that face us, including grey area systems. In this connection, we would propose to the Allies that the West propose not to deploy ER if the Soviets will refrain from deploying the SS-X-20.

All agreed with this approach. Mr. Vest and others pointed out that great care is needed in advancing this position because of Allied sensitivities on both the ER and grey-area issues, and because Schmidt has already proposed to tie ER to MBFR. Ambassador Resor felt that production and deployment of ER would weaken the NATO MBFR nuclear offer, but that an arms control proposal would mitigate this problem.

The SCC agreed to recommend to the President the following:

1. An initial approach to Chancellor Schmidt outlining our position in favor of ER production, seeking his agreement to support the deployment of ER and to begin consultations on broad security issues, in particular grey-area systems. At the same time we would broach the idea of an ER/SS-20 trade as an alternative to the MBFR approach while being willing to consider both. This line would build on Chancellor Schmidt's recent proposals (a) for four-power consultations on SALT and (b) for linking ER to MBFR.
2. Preparation of an interagency working group paper that would (1) construct a strategy for Allied consultations on grey-area systems and on ER, (2) outline further interagency work required to understand the grey-area issues and to develop a US approach to the consultations, including the initial discussions on the ER question and the possible link of ER to the SS-20.

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**Routing Slip**

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Remarks:

*The DCI has seen.*

Executive Secretary

*29 Nov*

Date

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*20 Nov 77*

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *NSC*)

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